At an advisory group meeting in Vienna in November, U.S. officials briefed NSG members on the details of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. France and Russia refused to provide the group with more information on their future intentions for cooperation with India and it was proposed that all future Indian exemptions require the same non-proliferation standards as the agreement with the United States. At the November meeting, suppliers concluded negotiations on the guidelines. The final agreement, wrote George Vest Kissinger, “served to fill many of the gaps and inadequacies of previous agreements on nuclear cooperation between suppliers and recipients. It also told the French and West Germans that they are restricting access to sensitive nuclear technologies. However, as the guidelines pointed out, the guidelines would not prevent the “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsecured developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technologies. An evaluation of the 1975 nuclear supplier guidelines, in which Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs George Vest wrote that they “serve to bridge many loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients,” but could not prevent the “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities. A series of meetings in London from 1975 to 1978 resulted in agreements on export guidelines. These were published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as INFCIRC/254 (essentially the Zangger “Trigger List”). The goods on the list could only be exported to non-nuclear states if certain security measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency had been agreed or if there were exceptional security conditions. During the plenary session, the group heard briefings on developments in third countries and continued to review the implementation of the Declaration of Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, which excludes the State from the requirement of the IAEA Comprehensive Guarantee Agreement as a condition of nuclear trade.
During the meeting, the NSG decided to set up a “procedure for suspending nuclear transfers to countries that do not meet their guarantees” through national decisions. In addition, it was agreed that “where the IAEA can no longer exercise its guarantee mandate in a recipient country, the supplier and recipient states should develop appropriate measures to benefit from recidivism protection measures.” Finally, TSN members agreed to “establish the existence of effective export controls in the receiving state as a criterion for the supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and as a factor in the consideration of dual-use goods and technologies.” On 3 March, the IAEA approved the additional protocol to India`s safeguard agreement, which differs at several levels from the former PPUs between the Agency and other states.